However, the statement had also a sort of an icebreaking impact, when those condolences echoed on the Turkish societal level, and many in Turkey, since then, started to have a closer look at what happened in In Armenia, the reaction was onefold: only a large recognition of the Genocide by Turkey, nothing less, can trigger something between Armenia and Turkey.
In other words, no recognition, no talks. As the commemorative events of the Centennial were not of a big importance for Turkey, the end of those events neither had an impact on the overall Turkish foreign policy on Armenia or Armenia-Turkey relations. The year was not pivotal either in negative or positive way. The same silence and apathy was from the Armenian side, which was in stand-by mode since , when it realized that its efforts towards normalization of relations were shadowed by the NK conflict conditionality or other reasons.
Turkey tried to forget soon the year a year full of political stress from Russia, Syria, the refugees, and domestic constraints, and to move forward without being aware of a crisis that was awaiting it a few months later…. Before the coup attempt, and without the state of emergency that would very soon become an unprecedented and hard reality for Turkey and its society, Turkish decision- and policy-makers were more focused on issues listed above, but there was also a tiny optimism or hope about new opportunities in Armenia-Turkey normalization.
The Genocide Centennial was over, and the pressure from all possible places was behind. To capitalize on that slight optimism and opportunities, some steps have been taken by the Turkish side that proved to be unproductive. An issue of a Century: New approaches in the Democratization Process.
(PDF) European Perceptions of Turkish Foreign Policy | Talip Kucukcan - flurormoribam.gq
On the Turkish MFA level as well, one could witness some activities. That was not an evidence that Turkey was ready to resume negotiations with Armenia and proceed to the ratification of the Protocols, but a sign that Armenia was on the Turkish radar. However, in June , Turkey gets quite nervous when German MPs approved a motion describing the massacre of Armenians by Ottoman forces a century ago as genocide. Turkey recalls its Ambassador from Berlin and sends messages about its reluctance to make any new moves towards normalization, while for the Armenian side the Bundestag recognition was an achievement after No need to go through all details and nuances of the military coup on July 15, The bad news is that Turkey is still in that state of emergency with all the implications of the post-coup purge, which directly affects the reality on the ground.
Many have opted to leave the country to avoid those persecutions, while others try not to be explicitly active either in civil or political way. To many, it reminds the Soviet Union of the s. But still, no need to overreact to the reality on the ground.
In the same vein, there are also those in Turkey who are happy with the religion similar to a big number of Armenians in Armenia who support the role of the church in public life and affiliated themselves to the Armenian Apostolic Church  and want to return to more traditionalism. The same for politics. Both camps constitute the societal and political landscape of modern Turkey.
Agendas of both sides can be both different and convergent for certain issues. Not everything happening in Turkey comes from one, or even two political sources. Multilayer reality on the ground is an important and inseparable part of political-societal transformations and religious trends which Turkey is going through. The rest is window dressing. This was one of the topics that I was particularly interested to explore. Analytically and for propaganda purposes, it is very convenient to consider him as a new religious bigot to push regular info-consumers to associate him with leaders of ISIS, Kaddafi, Hussein, etc.
He may resort to this historically effective tool as much as he needs to get reelected in And he will especially turn to ultranationalists through the religion for a political support. This perspective is shared by many liberals in Turkey who oppose to losing or weakening the secularism in Turkey and democratic values.
On the other hand, religious adepts are not uncommon in Armenia, and it is surprising that Islamophobia or the fears of the religious rise in Turkey, has still its influence over minds of some Armenians who are explicitly proud of being the first nation who adopted Christianity as a state religion.
Many in Armenia see the Armenian Church and Christian religion as one of the pillars of the Armenian identity, advocate for family values, more traditionalism or conservatism, etc. Why then Islam, as a religion which was practiced in Turkey over centuries, as well as revival of traditionalism and conservatism should be dangerous for Turks or others? Then, what about the role and power of Islam in Iran, another neighboring to Armenia country, with an entire political system based on Islamic laws and values?
Why Armenia does not have same resentments and religious fears from Iran, a country which is considered by a number of countries, including the US as a sponsor of terrorism? My overall assumption about religions and the role they play in modern world, including Turkey that I voiced many years ago, is that religions are in the stage of decline. Even though Islam is still in rise in the world due to a number of reasons, including the age of Islam compared of other mainstream religions, the overall number of believers is decreasing. Different religions, despite opposite assertions by many adepts, are weakening their grasp and importance at different speeds.
The research shows that those who identify Turkey as an Islamic country is at The number of those who define Turkey as a European country, however, has been steadily increasing every year.
While Also, Turkey is the 55 th among countries with a total number of online searches for sex toys  and this, with Internet restrictions in Turkey and the number of sex-shops operating in the country. All my interviews touched upon the issue of the state of emergency and talked about its negative impact on all possible dimensions, including the normalization process. Here are some of those insights about Armenia-Turkey relations:. As one could notice, in this paper there are many answers by interviewees which are presented in an anonymous way.http://vitektransportation.com/scripts/myseloh/zequ-sagittarius-december-4.php
It is because many of those interviewees, but not all, were afraid to be identified. He needs to use all his powers, contacts, money and influence to get the office. The establishment of the cult of personality is in progress. Probably, they are right. He will also use soft power by creating an image of a caring politician. In that context, the Kurds as well constitute an important constituency. And again, let us see what are obstacles, opportunities and perspectives in Armenia-Turkey relations and rapprochement identified by my interviewees:.
The overall impression is that Armenia in general, and the normalization process in particular, are not part of current political discourse. Turkey is stuck in a domestic crisis, and secondary issues are ignored, including in the media. An important part of my trip to Ankara was to understand how Turkish media reacts to what is happening in Armenia, or is related to Armenia either in negative or positive way , Armenia-Turkey relations and the Genocide issue. During those 21 years, distribution of items by year exhibits a great variation.
During that period, it was observed that the Genocide became a hot topic in some years, while it was mentioned in a few items in other years. The most remarkable increase occurred in , th year of Genocide; the number of published items were almost twice as much than the previous years.
Even though, not numerous, but before , those media outlets were producing interesting media content about the Genocide issue, Armenians in Turkey, the Armenian cause, relations with Armenia, Armenian heritage in the Ottoman Empire, Islamized Armenians, etc. However, the situation changes after By chance, I could find some analytical materials by two Armenian scholars Meline Anumyan and Gor Yeranyan about the post-coup Turkish media and Armenian issues.
Agos is still operating as well. As already mentioned in previous paragraphs, on September 20, , the Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan made his minute statement at the general debate of the 72 nd session of the UN General Assembly. We will enter the spring of without those, as our experience has demonstrated, futile Protocols. What about Turkey? What was Turkish feedback and reaction to a news about 8-year old Protocols? An interesting appearance has been detected on the official portal of Turkish MFA, starting from the second semester of or the beginning of This new content in form of a banner with submenus and sub-contents is added on the bottom of the official portal of the Turkish MFA for an easier access.
The amount of those activities and projects decreased significantly after the coup attempt of leaving as well fewer donors from international organizations willing to invest in Armenia-Turkey rapprochement. Monitoring and analyzing the Turkish media showed an explicit asymmetry in the coverage of issues from both sides of closed borders. There is too much Turkey in the Armenian media, and too little Armenia in the Turkish media, especially after the coup attempt. Too many other questions and issues I tried to explore and analyze during my trip to Ankara, like someone who is trying to get as much gold as possible from a rich golden mine when an opportunity arises.
The readers can understand that answering all these questions in detail and putting all the replies in this paper along with my comments and explanations, would turn this paper into a book. Therefore, before proceeding to the concluding remarks, let me present some answers, explanations or findings that might be interesting for readers.
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The short answer is: no! Invocations of the Article law insulting Turkishness or the Turkish nation have become a far less common tool than before. The long answer depends on how we define the use of Genocide and the context. Many books, research, articles and analytical material exist on the topic, and many of them do easily use the word Genocide. The Article is no longer valid in a way it used to be before amendments on April, However, that law is used only for the Parliamentarians in the framework of their activities inside of the Parliament.
But still the very word of Genocide did not seem to be a taboo in Turkey. It will be hard to deny that issues related to Pan-Turkism and Neo-Ottomanism although many in Armenia refer to it as Pan-Ottomanism are discussed in Armenia more often that in very Turkey. Many keep arguing that the Ottoman Empir,e driven by Pan-Turkist ideology, wanted but failed to exterminate all the Armenians.
Instead, the modern Turkey will resume the plan, if such an opportunity arises. It will reach its goal at any price, including ethnic cleansings. It will be difficult and challenging, and probably not acceptable by many fellow Armenians, to deny those claims which have historical and psychological connotations. It is even more complicated to explore real reasons behind those fears and threat perceptions. It is directly linked to Turkish nationalism, was promoting the idea of a unique Turkish-Muslim identity, and initially sought to unite the Turks of the Ottoman and Russian empires against the growing Russian tsarist domination.
It was encouraging a Turkic cultural unity. Could be. The point is to see if those ideologies went through transformations during about 95 years of the Turkish Republic. Those initiatives and attempts failed also for Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, or Kyrgyzstan. Those times have gone. Turkey can be a sponsor, a donor, or a partner, but certainly not an umbrella given also a number of cultural, social, and political differences between them and divergence of interests. Financially, politically, and from many other perspectives, Turkey is not considered as a leader among Turkic peoples.
He was crazy and stupid. He wanted to have Islamism as ideology and be connected with Muslim Brotherhood. He failed because he was wrong. Nobody in Turkey takes pan-Turkism seriously. And why would they do so?